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Comment
Scientific Misconduct in 'Academia: A
Survey and Analysis of Applicable Law
During the past decade, the public trust in science as a discipline
and the integrity of scientists have been challenged by multiple
reports of data falsification, plagiarism, and misrepresentation of
research results. Misconduct in science has its origins in the cul-
ture of medical education, academic promotion policies, editorial
peer review deficiencies, and lack of institutional action.
This Comment will define scientific misconduct, analyze its ori-
gins, and survey applicable federal agency regulations and federal
laws that structure the response of the academic community to
this complex problem. It concludes that additional institutional
self-regulation and a more vigorous application of existing laws
may be required to prevent and detect scientific misconduct.
I. INTRODUCTION
By the age of thirty, Dr. Stephen Breuning had achieved a na-
tional reputation from his studies on the drug treatment of the men-
tally retarded. Between 1979 and 1984, this research psychologist
"'produced one-third of the literature in the [field].' "I His studies
influenced several states to modify their treatment policies.2 Breun-
ing was working at the University of Pittsburgh in 1983 when Rob-
1. Brand, It was Too Good to be True, TIME, June 1, 1987, at 59 (quoting Dr.
Robert L. Sprague, Prof., Institute for Research and Human Development, University of
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Ill.).
2. Byrne, Breuning Pleads Guilty, 242 Sci. 27, 27 (1988).
ert Sprague, a University of Illinois scientist collaborating with
Breuning on a project, became suspicious of Breuning's results.
Sprague noted an impossible 100% agreement on independently
rated patient behavioral scores.3 He further concluded that some of
Breuning's studies could not have been completed in the time allot-
ted.4 Sprague communicated his concerns to the National Institute
of Mental Health (NIMH), the federal agency that funded Breun-
ing's work. An investigation on the matter was turned over to the
University of Pittsburgh. Although Breuning confessed to falsifying
some earlier work, the University reported to NIMH that it
"'[found] no serious fault with Dr. Breuning's activities.' "' NIMH
subsequently initiated its own inquiry. Over three years after
Sprague first notified NIMH, the agency concluded Breuning
"'knowingly, wilfully and repeatedly engaged in misleading and de-
ceptive practices'" in reporting research.6 On September 19, 1988,
Breuning pled guilty to two counts of false grant statements,7 in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. section 1001.8 This case represented the first fed-
eral criminal conviction for "scientific fraud."'
This case, although notorious, is unfortunately not unique. During
the past decade, many incidents of data falsification, plagiarism, and
misrepresentation of research results have been reported in both sci-
entific journals and the mass media. Such reports not only challenge
the integrity of scientists but erode public trust in the entire scien-
tific enterprise. More significant is the potential harm to the public:
fraudulent medical research can cause direct harm to patients; and,
false data can be used to set public policy. 10 In addition, legal issues
arise, concerning the rights and responsibilities of the scientists in-
volved, the universities in which their research is conducted, the
agencies which fund it, and the periodicals which publish it.11 Con-
3. Anderson, First Scientific Fraud Conviction, 335 NATURE 389 (1988).
4. Id.; see also Roman, When Good Scientists Turn Bad, DISCOVER, Apr. 1988,
at 50, 52.
5. Maintaining the Integrity of Scientific Research: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Investigations and Oversight of the Comm. on Science, Space, and Technol-
ogy, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 183 (1989) [hereinafter Maintaining the Integrity of Scien-
tific Research] (testimony of Dr. Robert L. Sprague).
6. HHS: Grants Administration; Debarment; Stephen E. Breuning, 52 Fed. Reg.
47,760 (1987); Anderson, supra note 3, at 389.
7. United States v. Breuning, Criminal No. K-88-0135 (D.C. Md. Nov. 10,
1988); see also Byrne, supra note 2, at 27 (Breuning pled guilty to two counts of submit-
ting false research results in his application for more than $200,000 in grant funds from
NIMH. In return, the prosecution dropped a third charge that Breuning attempted to
obstruct an NIMH investigation into his research).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
9. Anderson, supra note 3, at 389.
10. For a discussion of the significance of reliable scientific data in formulating
public policy, see generally Note, Of Reliable Science: Scientific Peer Review, Federal
Regulatory Agencies, and the Courts, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 27 (1987).
11. Teich, Foreword, in AAAS-ABA NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS AND
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cern over these issues has stimulated congressional inquiry 2 as well
as dialogue among members of the scientific and legal communities
to study the problem."
This Comment will analyze scientific misconduct and survey appli-
cable federal law that structures the response of the academic com-
munity to this complex problem. Part II presents an overview of the
problem, including the definition of scientific misconduct, estimated
prevalence, and causal and contributing factors. Part III examines
the current federal agency regulations that govern the investigation
of scientific misconduct cases. Policy, procedure, and considerations
of due process and confidentiality in the conduct of investigations are
also discussed. Part IV surveys the key federal agency, criminal, and
civil sanctions available to punish those who commit scientific mis-
conduct. These include: debarment from federal programs,1 4 crimi-
nal prosecution under statutes governing false statements' 5 and false
claims,16 and civil prosecution under the False Claims Act.'7 This
Comment concludes that while the current provisions are a signifi-
cant step toward achieving deterrence and responsible investigation
of misconduct cases, a comprehensive program addressing the prob-
lem will require increased efforts directed at prevention and detec-
tion at the institutional level. If universities and members of the sci-
entific community do not accomplish this voluntarily, additional
federal regulatory measures may be required to safeguard the integ-
rity of scientific research.
SCIENTISTS, PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC FRAUD AND MISCONDUCT: REPORT ON WORKSHOP
NUMBER ONE at v (1988) [hereinafter NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS AND
SCIENTISTS No. 1] (available at AAAS Office of Public Sector Programs, 1333 H Street,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005).
12. See Maintaining the Integrity of Scientific Research, supra note 5; Federal
Response to Misconduct in Science: Are Conflicts of Interest Hazardous to our Health?
Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988); Scientific Fraud and Misconduct and the Federal Response. Hearing
Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988); Fraud in Biomedical Research: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investiga-
tions and Oversight of the Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).
13. See generally NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS AND SCIENTISTS No. 1,
supra note 11.
14. 45 C.F.R. §§ 76.100-.510, 620.100-.510 (1990).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988).
17. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988).
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT
A. Formal Definition
The definition of misconduct in science is controversial because of
concern over the meaning of fraud and misconduct and the role of
honest error and differences in professional judgment.18 Recently,
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) of the Public Health Ser-
vice (PHS) and the National Science Foundation (NSF), the two
major funding sources of university research,"" have promulgated
standards for actionable misconduct in science. Under the NIH/
PHS definition, misconduct means "fabrication, falsification, plagia-
rism, or other practices that seriously deviate from those that are
commonly accepted within the scientific community for proposing,
conducting, or reporting research. It does not include honest error or
honest differences in interpretations or judgments of data."'20 The
NSF definition is similar but more broad,21 adding that retaliation
against a person who in good faith reported suspected misconduct is
also actionable.22
These definitions proscribe intentional dishonesty and contraven-
tion of accepted scientific practices. To prove a case of fabrication,
18. See Responsibilities of Awardee and Applicant Institutions for Dealing With
and Reporting Possible Misconduct in Science, 54 Fed. Reg. 32,446, 32,447 (1989)
[hereinafter PHS Final Rule] (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 50) (discusses public com-
ments and federal departmental response to proposed definition of "Misconduct in
Science").
19. See NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUND., VOL 38, FEDERAL FUNDS FOR RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT: FISCAL YEARS 1988, 1989. AND 1990, at 35, 44-45 (in fiscal year
1990, universities will receive an estimated 64% of NIH funds and 75% of NSF funds
for basic research, and 59 % of NIH funds and 72% of NSF funds for applied research).
20. 42 C.F.R. § 50.102 (1990).
21. 56 Fed. Reg. 22,286, 22,287 (1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.1). The
current NSF definition states:
(a) "Misconduct" means
(1) fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other serious deviation from ac-
cepted practices in proposing, carrying out, or reporting results from activities
funded by NSF; or
(2) retaliation of any kind against a person who reported or provided informa-
tion about suspected or alleged misconduct and who has not acted in bad faith.
Id. The NSF definition extends "misconduct" to cover not only research but all "activi-
ties funded by NSF." See id. This is a response to the fact that a substantial portion of
NSF funding supports science and engineering education rather than research and in
many NSF activities, research and education are inextricably mixed. Id. at 22,287.
22. This addition is based on NSF's belief that such retaliation is not only a seri-
ous deviation from accepted practices in the scientific community, but it can also be a
furtherance of the misconduct being reported. Id. at 22,287. The explicit inclusion of
retaliation in the NSF definition of misconduct is not inconsistent with the NIH/PHS
approach. Id. The NIH/PHS regulations require awardee institutions to have policies
and procedures that provide for "undertaking diligent efforts to protect the positions and
reputations of those persons who, in good faith, make allegations [of misconduct]." 42
C.F.R. § 50.103(d)(13) (1990).
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falsification or plagiarism, 23 it must be shown that a scientist know-
ingly made up or misrepresented information during the course of
government-funded research. 4 Unlike the common law tort model of
fraud, 5 proof that someone relied upon the misrepresentation or was
damaged as a result is not required.26 Serious deviation from ac-
cepted practices or "scientific malpractice" is misconduct if the be-
havior amounts to gross negligence or intentional action comparable
to falsification or plagiarism.27 Deviant practices that might consti-
tute intentional misconduct under these definitions include failure to
acknowledge collaborators, selective omission of data to favor hy-
potheses, and simultaneous multiple submission of an article tojournals.28
B. Prevalence and Scope
There is little confirmed data on the prevalence of scientific mis-
conduct. However, federal agency experience and independent stud-
ies are informative. Together they suggest a great deal of misconduct
goes undetected and the number of reported cases and allegations is
increasing, particularly in the medical field.
In recent years, both the NIH and the NSF received an increase
in allegations of misconduct. As of 1987, the NIH received about
twenty misconduct-related allegations per year.29 It currently re-
ceives approximately 150 per year.30 Between 1980 and 1987, twelve
23. Fabrication or "dry-labbing" refers to the partial or wholesale forgery of data.
Falsification is the false reporting of observations and methods. Plagiarism is the appro-
priation of another's words, ideas, or data. See Chubin, Research Malpractice, 35 BIoS-
CIENCE 80, 81 (1985) [hereinafter Research Malpractice]; Chubin, Misconduct in Re-
search: An Issue of Science Policy and Practice, 23 MINERVA 175 (1985).
24. Anderson, The Federal Government's Role in Regulating Misconduct in Sci-
entific and Technological Research, 3 J.L. & TECH. 121, 127 (1988).
25. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 728 (5th ed. 1984) (tort
cause of action for deceit includes five elements: (1) a false representation of fact; (2)
made by one with knowledge or belief that the representation is false; (3) the representa-
tion was made with intent to induce reliance upon it; (4) others justifiably rely; (5) dam-
ages result from such reliance).
26. Anderson, supra note 24, at 127.
27. Id. at 130.
28. Id.; see also Research Malpractice, supra note 23, at 81.
29. Woolf, Deception in Scientific Research, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 67, 73 (1988) (re-
porting on results of an interview with Mary Miers, Institutional Liaison Officer, Office
of Extramural Research, NIH (July, 1987)). Of these, 10 to 12 per year were serious
enough to investigate and one or two per year necessitated action. Between 1980 and
1987, about 15 allegations resulted in some type of sanction. Id.
30. Telephone interview with Alan Price, Senior Scientist, Office of Scientific In-
tegrity, National Institutes of Health, Public Health Service (June 14, 1990). Ten to 20
charges of misconduct were reviewed by the NSF and found to re-
quire investigation.3 1 Twenty-two misconduct allegations were re-
ceived by NSF during the first half of fiscal year 1990.32
An analysis of the publicly reported cases of scientific misconduct
was conducted by Woolf 3 3 Twenty-six cases were reported between
1980 and 1987. In contrast, only fourteen cases were revealed be-
tween 1950 and 1970. Of those reported after 1980, twenty-two(85 %) were medical-related, involving individuals who had M.D. de-
grees and/or were affiliated with medical schools, hospitals or medi-
cal research institutions. In over half of these cases, the primary fac-
tor in detection was follow-up on coworkers' suspicions.
Few efforts to survey the extent of scientific misconduct have been
made. One 1988 study analyzed the responses of 259 deans whose
institutions were affiliated with the Council of Graduate Schools.3 4
Overall, twenty percent reported an instance of verified misconduct
among their faculties during the past five years. The rate of miscon-
duct increased with research intensiveness: among the subgroup "re-
search universities ' 35 the proportion was thirty-two percent. Sigma
Xi, the honor society for science researchers, conducted a survey of
its members in 1988.36 Nineteen percent of the nearly 3800 respon-
dents indicated they had direct knowledge of misconduct on the part
of a professional scientist.3 7 Respondents who had worked on a fed-
per year are considered serious enough to warrant investigation. About 50 cases were
closed in 1989, 25% of which resulted in a finding of misconduct and some kind of
sanction. The current active caseload is 80 cases: 20 are being investigated by the NIH;
60 are being conducted by the host research institutions. Id.
31. Woolf, supra note 29, at 74 (reporting on results of an interview with Jerome
Frigeau, Director of Division of Oversight and Investigation at the NSF (July, 1987)).
Of these, at least seven were judged to be warranted. Id.
32. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUND., SEMIANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS, No. 2, OT. 1, 1989 - MAR. 31, 1990, at 19. After preliminary
review, only five were closed for lack of evidence or jurisdiction. Results of the remaining
17 are still pending. Id. The 1990 caseload is projected to be 45 cases. Telephone inter-
view with Philip Sunshine, Counsel to the Inspector General, National Science Founda-
tion (June 14, 1990).
33. Woolf, supra note 29, at 76-83.
34. Swazey, Louis, & Anderson, University Policies and Ethical Issues in Re-
search and Graduate Education: Highlights of the CGS Deans' Survey, CGS COMMUNI-
CATOR, Mar. 1989, at 1.
35. "Research universities" are those offering the full range of baccalaureate pro-
grams, are committed to graduate education through the doctoral level, and give priority
to research. They obtain $12.5 million or more in federal support annually and award a
minimum of 50 Ph.D. degrees a year. CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING, A CLASSIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 7 (1987).
36. Sigma Xi, Sketches of the American Scientist (1989), reported in OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUND., SURVEY DATA ON THE EXTENT OF
MISCONDUCT IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING, OIG 90-3214, at 4 (1990) [hereinafter
NSF SURVEY DATA].
37. The question posed was "'Excluding gross stupidities and/or minor slip ups
that can be charitably dismissed (but not condoned), I have direct knowledge of fraud(e.g., falsifying data, misreporting results, plagiarism) on the part of a professional scien-
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eral research grant were somewhat more likely to be aware of mis-
conduct than those who had not. A 1987 study analyzed responses
from 245 science researchers at a large high-ranking American uni-
versity.3 8 Thirty-two percent stated they had at some time suspected
a colleague of falsifying data and thirty-two percent had suspected a
colleague of plagiarism. While it is difficult to generalize from these
varied studies because some had low response rates, they indicate a
measure of known misconduct in the range of twenty percent.3 9 With
an estimated 5.3 million scientists and engineers employed in the
United States,40 scientific misconduct is probably more prevalent
than the number of publicly reported cases suggests. However, more
research is needed before the full extent of scientific misconduct is
known.
C. Causal and Contributing Factors
A number of factors are advanced to explain the occurrence of
scientific misconduct. Some suggest it is the result of a pathological
personality,41 thus focusing on the individual malefactor. Others fo-
cus on organizational factors, including: (1) the culture of medical
education; (2) changes in science; (3) pressure to publish; (4) failure
of the editorial peer review system; and (5) reluctance on the part of
institutions and journals to act on misconduct.
Medical education is implicated because a high number of miscon-
duct cases involve those with an M.D. degree.42 The "pre- med" syn-
drome, which begins with excessive emphasis on grades and competi-
tion in college, is thought to promote dishonesty.43 In one study of
400 medical students at two Chicago medical schools, eighty-eight
percent reported they had cheated at least once as pre-meds; a ma-jority continued to cheat in medical school.4 4 "[A] continuum from
tist.'" Id. at 4.
38. Tangney, Fraud Will Out - Or Will It? NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 6, 1987, at 62.
39. NSF SURVEY DATA, supra note 36, at 8-9.
40. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUND., U.S. SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS: 1988, FINAL ES-
TIMATES, NSF 90-314, DETAILED STATISTICAL TABLES 9 (1990). Approximately 712,300
are employed in educational institutions, of which 531,300 are affiliated with four-year
colleges and universities. Id.
41. McDonald, Fraud in Scientific Research: Is it the Work of "Psychopaths'?
Chron. Higher Educ., June 15, 1983, at 7, col. 1.
42. See supra text accompanying note 33.
43. Petersdorf, The Pathogenesis of Fraud in Medical Science, 104 ANNALS IN-
TERNAL MED. 252, 252 (1986) [hereinafter The Pathogenesis of Fraud]; see also Peter-
sdorf, A Matter of Integrity, 64 ACADEMIC MED. 119 (1989).
44. Barrett, The Premed Machine, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1985, at 41, 43.
cheating in college, to cheating in medical school in didactic areas,
to cheating in clerkships in patient care" was observed.45 In another
study, medical students' attitudes on physician fraud and abuse in
Medicare and Medicaid programs were examined.46 Students' atti-
tudes toward such practices as physicians billing for services not per-
formed were unusually lenient. Most thought such behavior would
go unpunished and favored mild penalties for program violations.
Several justified violations because the programs were inefficient and
reimbursed at a low rate. Cheating and lax attitudes toward fraud in
medical school may lead to scientific misconduct later in a research
career.
Another factor may be recent changes in science. Before World
War II, scientific research was largely conducted by individual inves-
tigators.47 A successful scientist now often presides over the research
of a large group of junior scientists, increasing the chances of inade-
quate supervision. 48 In at least one misconduct case, the Darsee inci-
dent, inadequate supervision by the senior scientist was viewed as a
contributing factor. John Darsee had fabricated data in his cardiol-
ogy research at Harvard Medical School. His supervisor, Eugene
Braunwald was in charge of two complete laboratories, was physi-
cian-in-chief to two of Harvard's hospitals and was continually head-
ing meetings around the country.4 9 The NIH investigating commit-
tee that found Darsee guilty of misconduct concluded that
Braunwald's remoteness from daily laboratory operations helped
keep Darsee's fabrication from discovery; a simple check of Darsee's
notebook might have uncovered the misconduct early.50
Perhaps the most cited cause for scientific misconduct is pressure
to publish research results. Wool5 has identified three arguments
commonly made to explain this relationship. First, several cases of
misconduct occurred in prestigious laboratories where supervisors
published a great deal. Darsee's supervisor Braunwald, for example,
published 171 papers in the five years preceding Darsee's 1981 inci-
dent.5 12 A supervisor's high rate of publication might pressure a
45. Id. at 43-44.
46. Keenan, Brown, Pontell & Geis, Medical Students' Attitudes on Physician
Fraud and Abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid Programs, 60 J. MED. EDuC. 167
(1985).
47. LaFollette, Beyond Plagiarism: Ethical Misconduct in Scientific and Techni-
cal Publishing, BOOK REs. Q., Winter 1988-89, at 65, 67.
48. See Woolf, Fraud in Science: How Much, How Serious? HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Oct. 1981, at 9, 12.
49. W. BROAD & N. WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH 157 (1982).
50. Glazer, Combating Science Fraud, 2 EDITORIAL Ras. REP. 390, 396 (1988).
51. Woolf, 'Pressure to Publish' is a Lame Excuse for Scientific Fraud, Chron.
Higher Edue., Sept. 23, 1987, at A52, col. 1.
52. Id. at A52, col. 3.
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subordinate to achieve the same.83 Second, several famous perpetra-
tors were themselves prolific publishers. For example, Robert Slut-
sky, who falsified data at the medical school of the University of
California at San Diego, produced one paper every ten days while a
resident."4 Third, untenured faculty members are more often found
guilty of misconduct than tenured scholars. One reason may be the
demands of our system of academic promotions, which stresses quan-
tity of papers.5 A recent study of academic promotion at Johns
Hopkins University School of Medicine lends support to this the-
ory.56 During the three years preceding consideration for promotion,
faculty members who were promoted had about twice as many publi-
cations as did nonpromoted faculty.
Shortcomings in the editorial review process is another factor con-
tributing to scientific misconduct. Unlike other professions, science is
not regulated by formal mechanisms such as licensure. Quality con-
trol is achieved through social mechanisms operating in the scientific
community whereby researchers submit their work to the scrutiny of
other scientists.5 One of the principle mechanisms is editorial peer
review, also called the referee system.58 Here scientific journals send
out submitted manuscripts to experts called referees. The referees
are responsible for judging the merits of articles for publication and
for spotting any irregularities in method or argument. Although such
review is a point where scientific misconduct might be detected, it
has proved unreliable in doing so.5 It is asserted that plausible, in-
ternally consistent fabrications cannot be discovered in editorial peer
review. 0 However, in some cases, referees failed to discover statisti-
cal errors and improbable achievements.6 1 For example, among Dar-
see's eighteen published research papers, there was an average of
53. Id.
54. Engler, Covell, Friedman, Kitcher & Peters, Misrepresentation and Responsi-
bility in Medical Research, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1383, 1386 (1987) [hereinafter
Engler].
55. See The Pathogenesis of Fraud, supra note 43, at 253.
56. Batshaw, Plotnick, Petty, Woolf & Mellits, Academic Promotion at a Medical
School, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 741 (1988).
57. See Committee on the Conduct of Science, Natl Academy of Science, On Be-
ing A Scientist, 86 PROc. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 9053, 9065 (1989).
58. See W. BROAD & N. WADE, supra note 49, at 61.
59. For example, of the 137 articles published by Slutsky, 48 were later found to
be questionable and 12 were fraudulent. Engler, supra note 54, at 1383.
60. Id. at 1385; see also Relman, Lessons from the Darsee Affair, 308 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1415 (1983).
61. Engler, supra note 54, at 1385; see also Stewart & Feder, The Integrity of the
Scientific Literature, 325 NATURE 207 (1987).
twelve errors and discrepancies per paper; one had as many as
thirty-nine errors.8 2 Most could be recognized simply by careful ex-
amination63  and some were "so glaring as to offend common
sense."64 A striking instance of the latter was a bizarre pedigree de-
picting a family with an unusual heart disease. Inspection revealed
that a seventeen year-old male had four children, ages eight through
four, making him eight or nine when he impregnated the mother of
his first child. 5 Such errors raise serious doubts as to the ability of
the peer review system to deter misconduct through detection.
Reluctance on the part of institutions and journals to act on scien-
tific misconduct also contributes to the problem. Allegations of mis-
conduct are usually investigated by the accused's academic institu-
tion. Past tendencies favored suppression of problems and hostility
toward those who brought allegations.6 Thus, in the case of Jeffrey
Borer, a cardiologist accused of misrepresenting research at Cornell
University Medical College in 1981, a three-member panel convened
by the dean decided after a six-hour inquiry that the charges war-
ranted no further action. Due to the persistence of accuser Jerome
Jacobstein and his attorney, an NIH investigation was mounted, ulti-
mately confirming many of the charges seven years after they first
came to light. Given this protracted process, Jacobstein and other
"whistleblowers" like him have too often incurred professional and
personal sanctions including termination of employment, 8 loss of
grant funding,69 and hefty legal fees. ° While institutions have been
62. Stewart & Feder, supra note 61, at 209.
63. Id. at 207.
64. Id. at 208.
65. Id.
66. Maintaining the Integrity of Scientific Research, supra note 5, at 154 (testi-
mony of Dr. Paul J. Friedman, Prof. of Radiology, Dean for Academic Affairs, Univer-
sity of California, San Diego, School of Medicine, La Jolla, CA).
67. See Jacobstein, I Am Not Optimistic, Scientist, Dec. 14, 1987, at 11, col. 1;
Kolata, After 7-Year Dispute, a Cardiologist is Disciplined, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1987,
at C3, col. 3; Part 1: Chronicle of a Scientific Misconduct Case, Sci. & Gov't Rep., Nov.
1, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
68. See Hollis, I Turned in My Mentor, Scientist, Dec. 14, 1987, at 11, col. I(postdoctoral fellow Bruce Hollis, after questioning the research of supervising scientist
Philip Lambert, stated he was given notice of termination from his academic appoint-
ment at Case Western Reserve University); see also Wilford, Ex-Colleagues Turn Com-
batants, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1990, at B10, col. 1 (researcher Dr. Heidi Weissman
concluded she was dismissed from her position at Yeshiva University's Albert Einstein
College of Medicine and the Montefiore Medical Center in retaliation for legal action
against colleague Dr. Leonard Freeman for scientific misconduct).
69. See Sprague, I Trusted the Research System, Scientist, Dec. 14, 1987, at 11,
col. 1 (University of Illinois scientist Robert Sprague, after reporting concerns about
Stephen Breuning's research, found his research funding deferred and then reduced to
10% of that originally requested despite 16 years of prior continuous funding).
70. See Part 1: Chronicle of a Scientific Misconduct Case, supra note 67, at 3, col.
I (Jacobstein spent $13,000 in legal fees to pursue an investigation of colleague Jeffrey
Borer's research misconduct); see also Wilford, supra note 68, at B10, col. 3 (Dr. Weiss-
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mandated to adopt fair and expeditious procedures to handle allega-
tions of misconduct,71 whistleblowers remain vulnerable and have
mounted lawsuits to protect their interests.72 Concern over potential
lawsuits by those serving on academic investigative committees fur-
ther complicates open inquiry.73
Fear of legal action has likewise inhibited journals from printing
retractions of articles or publishing results of investigations of the
prior work of scientists shown to have committed misconduct. The
Slutsky investigation was impeded in this respect. The University of
California San Diego faculty committee that evaluated Slutsky's 135
publications reported to the thirty journals involved whether each ar-
ticle was valid, questionable, or fraudulent, requesting publication of
the conclusions.7 4 Half required more letters over a two-year period
to obtain a response. Of the thirteen journals that had valid articles,
only five published statements to that effect. Of the seventeen that
had any fraudulent or questionable articles, only nine printed state-
mann spent $500,000 in legal fees in her ordeal over Dr. Freeman's alleged misconduct).
71. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF AM. MEDICAL COLLEGES, FRAMEWORK FOR INSTI-
TUTIONAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH MISCONDUCT IN RESEARCH
(1989); ASSOCIATION OF AM. UNIVERSITIES & NATIONAL ASS'N OF STATE UNIVERSITIES
AND LAND-GRANT COLLEGES, FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONAL POLICIES AND PROCE-
DURES TO DEAL WITH FRAUD IN RESEARCH (1988). Similar documents recommending
institutions establish procedures to deal effectively with allegations of misconduct were
promulgated as early as 1982. See ASSOCIATION OF AM. MEDICAL COLLEGES, THE
MAINTENANCE OF HIGH ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH (1982);
ASSOCIATION OF AM. UNIVERSITIES, REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN UNI-
VERSITIES COMMITTEE ON THE INTEGRITY OF RESEARCH (1982).
72. Some have brought action against the academic institution regarding its inves-
tigation into allegations of a colleague's or a superior's scientific misconduct. See, e.g.,
Dong v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 191 Cal. App. 3d 1572, 236
Cal. Rptr. 912 (1987) (faculty member who accused colleague of scientific misconduct,
sued university for libel, infliction of emotional distress, and breach of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in investigation of allegations), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1019
(1988); Gordon, Lab Aide Sues U-M, Boss over Research, Detroit News and Free Press,
May 6, 1990, at 1A, col. 6 (University of Michigan research associate who reported
professor falsified laboratory data, committed plagiarism, and stole her research filed suit
against university and its investigating committee for negligence in treatment of allega-
tions). Others have brought action directly against the individual accused of misconduct.
See, e.g., Weissmann v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (author-re-
searcher sued colleague for copyright infringement in deleting author's name from article
and passing it off as colleague's own), affd in part and rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 219 (1989).
73. See Maintaining the Integrity of Scientific Research, supra note 5, at 155 (in
discussing an investigation into a case of misconduct at the University of California at
San Diego, Professor Paul Friedman noted that "one of the things we talked about at our
first committee meeting was are we going to get sued or are we liable for anything.").
74. Friedman, Correcting the Literature Following Fraudulent Publication, 263 J.
A.M.A. 1416 (1990).
ments covering all the articles reported to them. Explicitly acknowl-
edged by some of the journal editors, and implicit in the behavior of
others who cited discussions with their attorneys, was concern over
liability for libel to the author or coauthors. A similar concern
blocked retractions of articles by Breuning75 and delayed publication
of an investigation of Darsee's publications.76
III. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MISCONDUCT
INVESTIGATIONS
The NSF and the PHS, of which NIH is a part, are both author-
ized by Congress to establish regulations regarding scientific miscon-
duct at institutions receiving agency funds for research. 7 Final regu-
lations to administer this directive were issued by PHS in 1989.7 8
NSF's regulations were issued in 1987 and amended in 1991. 79 Be-
sides providing formal definitions of scientific misconduct,80 these
agency regulations delineate responsibilities for the detection and in-
vestigation of alleged misconduct.
A. Policy and Procedure
A central feature of the NSF and the NIH/PHS agency regula-
tions is the principle that awardee institutions bear the primary re-
75. Hostetler, Fear of Suits Blocks Retractions, Scientist, Oct. 19, 1987, at 1, col.
4.
76. Boffey, Major Study Points to Faulty Research at Two Universities, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 22, 1986, at CI, col. 3.
77. The PHS received its authority in 1985 when Congress enacted section 493 of
the Health Research Extension Act. Health Research Extension Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-158, § 493, 99 Stat. 820, 874-75 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 289b (1988)). The
NSF received general authority to establish regulations necessary for the administration
of the NSF grant program under the National Science Foundation Act of 1950. National
Science Foundation Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 507, § 11, 64 Stat. 149, 153-54 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988)).
78. Responsibility of PHS Awardee and Applicant Institutions for Dealing with
and Reporting Possible Misconduct in Science, 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.101-.105 (1990) (source:
54 Fed. Reg. 32,449 (1989)). The existing regulations focus on the responsibilities of
awardee institutions faced with possible scientific misconduct. See id. The PHS recently
proposed internal policies and procedures that focus on the responsibilities of PHS offices
and officials that deal with possible scientific misconduct. Policies and Procedures for
Dealing with Possible Scientific Misconduct in Extramural Research, 56 Fed. Reg.
27,384 (1991) (proposed June 13, 1991). The PHS is currently seeking public comment
on these proposed policies. Id. at 27,384; see also 56 Fed. Reg. 40,340 (1991) (extending
the public comment period).
79. Misconduct in Science and Engineering, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,286 (1991) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 689.1-.9) (current NSF amended regulations, effective May 14,
1991). The 1991 amendment to the NSF regulations was necessary to clarify the scope
of the misconduct regulations and the Office of Inspector General's authority and proce-
dures in misconduct cases. Id. at 22,286. The 1987 NSF regulations can be found at 52
Fed. Reg. 24,468 (1987) (amended 1991).
80. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 28: 401, 1991] Scientific Misconduct
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
sponsibility for conducting investigations."' Most grants are awarded
to institutions, rather than to individual researchers, 2 and awardee
institutions must assume accountability for the performance of the
supported activities.83 The main criticism advanced against this pol-
icy is that there is a conflict of interest posed by an institution inves-
tigating one of its own researchers.8 4 A disclosure of wrongdoing can
compromise an institution's reputation and financial support, thus
making it difficult to conduct an internal examination that is not bi-
ased in favor of the accused.
Despite this potential conflict of interest, this policy is efficient and
convenient. Institutions, rather than the federal government, are
often the first to learn of misconduct allegations and can quickly
deal with those that stem from minor misunderstandings.8 5 They also
have direct access to laboratories, research data, and witnesses.8 6
Furthermore, the regulations provide that both NSF and NIH/PHS
retain the authority to proceed with their own independent investiga-
tion if necessary.8 7 This provision is perhaps the most important
mechanism in the regulatory framework available to counteract any
bias that may result from internal investigations.
The NSF and the NIH/PHS set forth a two-tiered process to be
used by institutions in dealing with allegations of misconduct. First,
upon receiving an allegation or other information, the institution is
required to conduct an "inquiry. ' 8 8 This inquiry is a preliminary
fact-finding process to ascertain whether there is reason to believe
scientific misconduct was committed.8 9 If no substantive basis for the
allegation exists, there is no obligation that this be reported to the
awarding agency. 0 However, if the inquiry indicates the allegation is
81. 42 C.F.R. § 50.I04(a)(6) (1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 22,286, 22,288 (1991) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.3(a)).
82. Anderson, supra note 24, at 132.
83. See 42 C.F.R. § 50.102 (1990); see also Anderson, supra note 24, at 132.
84. Anderson, supra note 24, at 133; see also O'Toole, Point of View: Scientists
Must Be Able to Disclose Colleagues' Mistakes Without Risking Their Own Jobs or
Financial Support, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 25, 1989, A44, at A45, col. 2.
85. Anderson, supra note 24, at 134-35.
86. Id. at 135.
87. 42 C.F.R. § 50.104(a)(6) (1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 22,286, 22,289 (1991) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.4(d)(3).
88. 42 C.F.R. § 50.103(d)(1) (1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 22,286, 22,288 (1991) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.3(a)(1)).
89. 42 C.F.R. § 50.102 (1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 22,286, 22,288 (1991) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. § 689.1(c)).
90. However, NIH/PHS does require that the institution maintain sufficiently de-
tailed documentation of inquiries to allow an assessment of the reasons for concluding
that an investigation was not warranted, if necessary. 42 C.F.R. § 50.103(d)(6) (1990).
warranted, the institution proceeds to a more formal "investiga-
tion"91 to determine if misconduct occurred. The institution's deci-
sion to initiate an investigation must'be reported to the agency.9 2
The institution is also required to notify the awarding agency at any
time should specific exigencies exist.9 3 An investigation is complete
when a final report is submitted to the awarding agency.9' In addi-
tion, certain time requirements must be adhered to for the inquiry
and investigation stages.95 The NIH/PHS regulations further re-
quire institutions to give assurance that they have -a process consis-
tent with the foregoing as a condition for receipt of research funds.98
NSF, however, has no such requirement. Arguably, it should. Such a
requirement is one means of ensuring that institutions develop a pro-
cess for handling misconduct allegations satisfactory to the agency
prior to awarding assistance.
B. Due Process and Confidentiality Considerations
The NSF and the NIH/PHS regulations allow institutions flexi-
bility in adopting procedures that provide due process to the accused
in an investigation. The essential elements of due process are notice
and an opportunity to respond.9 7 The NIH/PHS regulations have
general directives incorporating these features. A written report
summarizing the evidence and conclusions of any inquiry is provided
to the accused.98 If an investigation is undertaken, the accused is
NIH/PHS also requires that a written report be prepared summarizing the evidence
reviewed, the relevant interviews obtained, and conclusions of the inquiry, and that it be
provided to the individual against whom the allegation was made. 42 C.F.R. §
50.103(d)(1) (1990).
91. An "investigation" is a formal examination and evaluation of all relevant facts
to determine if misconduct has occurred. 42 C.F.R. § 50.102 (1990); 56 Fed. Reg.
22,286, 22,288 (1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.1(c)).
92. 42 C.F.R. § 50.104(a)(1) (1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 22,286, 22,288 (1991) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.3(b)(1) & (2)).
93. Such exigencies include: (1) if immediate health hazards are involved; (2) if
there is a need to protect the interests of individuals involved; (3) if the misconduct is
serious or indicates a criminal violation. 42 C.F.R. § 50.104(b) (1990); 56 Fed. Reg.
22,286, 22,288 (1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.3(b)(3)).
94. See 42 C.F.R. § 50.104(a)(4) (1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 22,286, 22,288 (1991) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.3(b)(4)).
95. Under NSF regulations, an institution should complete any inquiry within 90
days and any investigation within 180 days. 56 Fed. Reg. 22,286, 22,288 (1991) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.3(c)). Under NIH/PHS regulations, an inquiry must be
completed within 60 days, an investigation is to be undertaken within 30 days of comple-
tion of the inquiry, and an investigation should ordinarily be completed within 120 days
of its initiation. 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.103(d)(1), .103(d)(7), .104(a)(2) (1990).
96. 42 C.F.R. § 50.103(a) (1990). This assurance was to be submitted to the Of-
fice of Scientific Integrity of NIH/PHS no later than January 1, 1990 and updated an-
nually thereafter along with certain information on allegations, inquiries, and investiga-
tions as the Secretary may prescribe. 42 C.F.R. § 50.103(b) (1990).
97. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
98. 42 C.F.R. § 50.103(d)(1) (1990).
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interviewed whenever possible99 and given an opportunity to com-
ment on findings of the investigation. 100 Requirements for securing
the necessary expertise to conduct an evaluation of the evidence in
an inquiry or investigation 01 and for taking precautions against con-
flicts of interest on the part of individuals involved are also pre-
scribed.102 The NSF regulations do not specify minimum due process
standards for institutional investigations,10 3 although they are de-
fined for independent NSF-conducted investigations.104 Thus, the
specific format of institutional misconduct investigations are largely
subject to the individual institutions' procedures for disciplinary ac-
tion. Such procedures generally do not approach the level of due pro-
cess demanded in the courts.1 5 In the context of public employment,
an institution may even terminate a faculty member using "'some-
thing less' than a full evidentiary hearing" 6 provided post-termina-
tion adjudicatory proceedings are available.1 " Because a scientist's
career may be destroyed by a finding that misconduct was commit-
ted, it has been suggested that a high degree of due process in the
investigation is in order.108
99. 42 C.F.R. § 50.103(d)(7) (1990).
100. 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.103(d)(3), .104(a)(2) (1990).
101. 42 C.F.R. § 50.103(d)(8) (1990).
102. 42 C.F.R. § 50.103(d)(9) (1990).
103. However, the NSF regulations do specify that in cases other than those in
which debarment is considered an appropriate disposition, the report received from any
investigation confirming misconduct will be provided by NSF to the subject of the inves-
tigation who will be invited to submit comments for consideration. 56 Fed. Reg. 22,286,
22,290 (1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.8(c)(2)).
104. See id. at 22,289 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.5(b) (when an NSF-
initiated investigation is conducted, written notice to the individuals to be investigated
will be given, unless notification would prejudice the investigation or a criminal investiga-
tion is underway); Id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.5(d)) (an investigation may
include, inter alia: interviews with parties or witnesses, opportunity for the subject to be
heard, and full adjudicatory hearings or other formal proceedings). For a discussion of
NSF investigative procedures into allegations of scientific misconduct, see generally An-
derson, supra note 24.
105. Mishkin, Responding to Scientific Misconduct: Due Process and Prevention,
260 J. A.M.A. 1932, 1932 (1988).
106. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985).
107. Id. at 547-48. For a discussion of constitutional due process in scientific mis-
conduct investigations and dismissal proceedings, see Olswang and Lee, Scientific Mis-
conduct: Institutional Procedures and Due Process Considerations, 11 J.C. & U.L. 51
(1984).
108. See Mishkin, supra note 105, at 1934-35 (commensurate with increased po-
tential sanctions, due process for the accused should include written notice of charges,
participation in the investigation by at least some scientists from institutions other than
that of the accused, a list of witnesses to be called at the hearing, representation by an
attorney at all stages of the formal proceedings, and opportunity to present evidence, call,
examine and cross-examine witnesses).
Confidentiality, at least in the initial review of misconduct allega-
tions, is also important because of the possible harm to the reputa-
tion of innocent individuals by incorrect charges and the need to pro-
tect accusers from retaliation. The NIH/PHS regulations set forth a
general directive for institutions to afford the accused confidential
treatment to the extent possible.109 The NSF rules do not specify
confidentiality for the accused undergoing institutional investigations
but do require any investigatory documents obtained by NSF to be
kept confidential to the extent permitted by law. 110 A similar provi-
sion is set forth in the NIH/PHS regulations."" The NIH/PHS
rules further prescribe that institutions protect the privacy of those
who in good faith report misconduct." 2 Likewise, the NSF will con-
duct investigations without revealing the identity of informants who
wish to remain anonymous." 3 However, procedural safeguards not-
withstanding, it has been observed that institutions cannot as a prac-
tical matter guarantee against disclosure of the identity of either the
informants"a4 or the subjects of misconduct reviews. 1 5
C. Agency Review of Investigations
The NSF and the NIH/PHS regulations provide for review of all
final reports of misconduct investigations prior to the imposition of
agency sanctions. Reports received by NIH/PHS are reviewed by
the agency's Office of Scientific Integrity to determine whether the
investigation was performed in a timely and competent manner. 11a
Final recommendations for action are prepared by the PHS Office of
Scientific Integrity Review and submitted to the Assistant Secretary
for Health." Reports received by the NSF are reviewed by its Of-
fice of Inspector General, 1 8 which provides notice to subjects of the
investigation and obtains their comments prior to submitting any
recommendations for action to the Deputy Director of NSF." 9 Final
109. 42 C.F.R. § 50.103(d)(3) (1990).
110. 56 Fed. Reg. 22,286, 22,289 (1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.4(b)).
111. 42 C.F.R. § 50.104(a)(1) (1990).
112. 42 C.F.R. § 50.103(d)(2) (1990).
113. 56 Fed. Reg. 22,286, 22,289'(1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.4(b)).
114. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 146 (the accused often learns the identity of
an informant because the accused knows the informant is the only one holding certain
information, or the informant directly confronts the accused).
115. See Robinson, The Law and University Procedures: An Institutional Perspec-
tive, in AAAS-ABA NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS AND SCIENTISTS, PROJECT ON
SCIENTIFIC FRAUD AND MISCONDUCT: REPORT ON WORKSHOP NUMBER THREE 91, 95-
96 (1989) [hereinafter NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS AND SCIENTISTS No. 3]
(available from AAAS Directorate for Science and Policy Programs, 1333 H Street,
N.W., Wash., D.C. 20005).
116. 42 C.F.R. § 50.104(a)(6) (1990).
117. 42 C.F.R. § 50.102 (1990).
118. 56 Fed. Reg. 22,286, 22,289 (1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.8(a)).
119. Id. at 22,290 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.8(c)(2)). However, if debar-
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NSF actions include, inter alia: letters of reprimand; restrictions on
a scientist's grant; and, debarment from receipt of agency funds for
an individual found guilty of scientific misconduct. 120 Similar sanc-
tions are available to the NIH/PHS.'2' These agency sanctions are
in addition to any sanction an institution may impose.122
IV. SANCTIONS FOR SCIENTIFC MISCONDUCT
A. Debarment
The stiffest sanction either the NIH/PHS or NSF may propose
for scientific misconduct is debarment. An individual who is debar-
red is excluded from financial and nonfinancial assistance under fed-
eral programs,1 23 including research grants.1 24 Debarment by one
agency has a government-wide effect as to all other federal
programs.123
The debarment regulations require that an individual first receive
notice of the charges.' 26 The individual may then submit information
in opposition to the debarment. 27 If the submission raises a genuine
issue of material fact, the individual accused is afforded the opportu-
nity to appear with a representative, submit evidence, present wit-
nesses, and confront any witness the agency presents. 28 The pro-
ceedings are recorded, 129 and written findings of fact are prepared. 30
ment is considered to be appropriate, the case is referred to the debarring official (either
the NSF Deputy Director or a designee) and the investigation report is provided to the
subject as part of the notice of proposed debarment. This notice includes instructions on
how to pursue an appeal. Id. at 22,289-290 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.8(c)(1)(i)-
(iii)).
120. Id. at 22,288 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.2(a)). Interim or temporary
restrictions are also available to the NSF, including suspension of an active grant or
proscribing particular research activities. Id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 689.2(b)).
121. These are currently proposed for inclusion in the NIH/PHS regulations. Poli-
cies and Procedures for Dealing with Possible Scientific Misconduct in Extramural Re-
search, 56 Fed. Reg. 27,384, 27,393 (1991) (proposed June 13, 1991).
122. Academic institutional actions for scientific misconduct may involve termina-
tion for cause of the faculty scientist. See Olswang and Lee, supra note 107, at 58.
123. 45 C.F.R. §§ 76.100(a), 620.100(a) (1990).
124. 45 C.F.R. §§ 76.110(a)(1)(i), 620.110(a)(1)(i) (1990).
125. 45 C.F.R. §§ 76.100(a), 620.100(a) (1990). A similar action, suspension, can
be invoked by an agency to exclude a person temporarily from participating in federally
assisted programs pending completion of an investigation and ensuing legal or debarment
proceedings. 45 C.F.R. §§ 76.105(u), 620.105(u) (1990). See generally 45 C.F.R. §§
76.400-.420, 620.400-.420 (1990) (suspension procedures).
126. 45 C.F.R. §§ 76.312, 620.312 (1990).
127. 45 C.F.R. §§ 76.313(a), 620.313(a) (1990).
128. 45 C.F.R. §§ 76.313(b)(1), 620.313(b)(1) (1990).
129. 45 C.F.R. §§ 76.313(b)(2), 620.313(b)(2) (1990).
Any debarment action imposed must be established by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.131 Where the individual was convicted of a
crime or received a civil judgment against him on a similar set of
facts, this standard is deemed satisfied. 32 The period of debarment
is for a time commensurate with the seriousness of the cause.133 In
the case of Stephen Breuning, who was debarred for misconduct as-
sociated with a grant supported by the PHS, the period was ten
years.3
B. Criminal Sanctions: False Statements and False Claims
Criminal prosecution is another means of sanctioning a scientist
who engages in scientific misconduct. Serious types of misconduct
have been prosecuted by various agencies of the* federal government
under 18 U.S.C. section 1001, the false statements statute.13
The statute is construed broadly,13 6 "much more broadly than is
necessary to catch miscreants in the scientific community."1 37 The
statute imposes criminal penalties on a defendant who: (1) know-
ingly and willfully, (2) made a statement that was (3) false, (4) ma-
terial, and (5) in a matter within the jurisdiction of a department or
agency of the United States.'38 As in other criminal prosecutions, a
130. 45 C.F.R. §§ 76.314(b)(1), 620.314(b)(1) (1990).
131. 45 C.F.R. §§ 76.314(c)(1), 620.314(c)(1) (1990).
132. Id.
133. 45 C.F.R. §§ 76.320(a), 620.320(a) (1990). Generally, this period should not
exceed three years unless circumstances warrant. 45 C.F.R. §§ 76.320(a)(1),
620.320(a)(1) (1990). In the recent case of Stanford University psychologist Philip Ber-
ger, the period of debarment imposed for scientific misconduct was three years. Berger
had reported that human subjects in some studies were drug-free when in fact they were
on medication. He also used as normal control subjects individuals who were identified as
memory impaired in another study. Palca, Scientific Misconduct Cases Revealed, 248
Sci. 297 (1990).
134. HHS: Grants Administration; Debarment; Stephen E. Breuning, supra note
6, at 47,760.
135. Section 1001 provides that:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by
any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ment or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
136. See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 480-82 (1984); Bryson v. United
States, 396 U.S. 64, 70 (1969); United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 507-08
(1955); United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941) (construing the predecessor to
section 1001); United States v. Adler, 380 F.2d 917, 922 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1006 (1967).
137. Edgar, Criminal Law Perspectives on Science Fraud, in NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF LAWYERS AND SCIENTISTS No. 3, supra note 115, at 139.
138. United States v. Whitaker, 848 F.2d 914, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Brantley, 786 F.2d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986);
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successful prosecution under section 1001 requires that each of the
applicable elements be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.13 9 The
requisite "statement" covers both sworn and unsworn statements, 4"
oral and written. 1" Materiality is established if the statement was
merely capable of influencing the exercise of a government func-
tion.142 No actual reliance or loss as a result of the statement need
be shown. 143 The element of "knowingly and willfully" is satisfied if
the defendant acts deliberately and with knowledge of the falsity of
the statement,4 or with a reckless disregard of the truth and a con-
United States v. Notarantonio, 758 F.2d 777, 785 (Ist Cir. 1985); United States v. Fitz-
gibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 879 (10th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Gahagan, 881
F.2d 1380, 1382 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Seay, 718 F.2d 1279, 1284 (4th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272,
1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980). See generally Peterson and Parker,
The Federal "False Statements" Statute: Workhorse of White Collar Prosecutions, 25
GA. ST. B.J. 85 (1988); Survey, White-Collar Crime: A Survey of the Law, 18 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 169, 273-80 (1980).
139. See Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20, 22 (1976); United States v. White
Horse, 807 F.2d 1426, 1429 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 842
n.12 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905 (1985).
140. See United States v. Adler, 380 F.2d 917, 922 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1006 (1967); see also United States v. Des Jardins, 772 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir.
1985).
141. See United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43, 46 (1952); United States
v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Worthington,
822 F.2d 315, 317-19 (2d Cir.) (making of check drawn on knowingly fictitious bank is a
false statement under section 1001), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944 (1987); United States v.
Des Jardins, 772 F.2d at 580 (section 1001 conviction for false oral, unsworn statement
to customs agent). Each false statement made in separate documents or transactions con-
stitutes a separate count of the offense. See United States v. Segall, 833 F.2d 144, 147-
48 (9th Cir. 1987) (three separate statements made by customs broker sufficient to sup-
port conviction for each of three separate counts of violating section 1001 in matter
within jurisdiction of customs service); United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 433 (5th
Cir.) (two false representations of name made in separate documents in matter within
jurisdiction of Social Security Administration constitute separate offenses of section
1001), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 (1986).
142. United States v. Land, 877 F.2d 17, 20 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 243
(1989); United States v. Gafyczk, 847 F.2d 685, 691 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 840 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Brantley, 786
F.2d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); United States v.
Notarantonio, 758 F.2d 777, 785 (Ist Cir. 1985); see also Kungys v. United States, 485,
U.S. 759, 770 (1988).
143. United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 840 F.2d at 700; United States v.
Campbell, 848 F.2d 846, 852 (8th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Kwait, 817 F.2d
440, 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987).
144. United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1143 (1986); see also United States v. Carrier, 654 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1981).
Proof of actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction, however, is not required for a
conviction under section 1001. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1984).
scious purpose to avoid learning the truth. 145 The statement in ques-
tion must be proven false; if it is ambiguous, it must be proven false
under any reasonable interpretation.1 46 The jurisdictional element is
satisfied when a federal agency has the power to exercise authority
with regard to the matter where the statement was made.1 47 Thus,
any application or report submitted for a research grant to a govern-
ment agency by an individual who knows that it contains false or
fabricated data is a violation of this statute. 4 The submission of
another's words as one's own also constitutes a violation.1 49 Further-
more, it is. not necessary that the false statement be presented di-
rectly to any agency of the government as long as federal funds are
involved.1 50 Thus it is sufficient for liability if a submission for a
grant is supported by a publication appearing elsewhere that the ap-
plicant knows is based on data that is falsified or fabricated." It is
under this statute that Stephen Breuning was successfully prosecuted
by the U.S. Attorney's Office for submitting false data to the PHS in
support of a grant.152
Criminal sanctions may also be imposed for scientific misconduct
under 18 U.S.C. section 287, the criminal false claims statute.15 3
Here the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant: (1) made or presented a claim to a United States govern-
ment agency; (2) that the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent;
and (3) that the defendant knew the claim was false, fictitious, or
145. United States v. White, 765 F.2d 1469, 1482 (lth Cir. 1985); see also
United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015
(1978).
146. United States.v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1289 (8th Cir. 1980); see also United
States v. Gahagan, 881 F.2d 1380, 1384 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Race, 632
F.2d 1114, 1120 (4th Cir. 1980).
147. United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984); United States v. Oren,
893 F.2d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Gibson, 881 F.2d 318,
322 (6th Cir. 1989).
148. Edgar, supra note 137, at 139.
149. Id. at 140.
150. United States v. Brantley, 786 F.2d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 477
U.S. 908 (1986); United States v. Petullo, 709 F 2d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Wolf, 645 F.2d 23, 25 (10th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Gibson, 881
F.2d at 322; United States v. Suggs, 755 F.2d 1538, 1542 (11th Cir. 1985).
151. Edgar, supra note 137, at 140.
152. United States v. Breuning, Criminal No. K-88-0135 (D.C. Md. Nov. 10,
1988).
153. Section 287 provides that:
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military, or
naval service of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any
claim upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof,
knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not
more than five years and shall be subject to a fine in the amount provided in
this title.
18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988).
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fraudulent.15 4 In contrast to a false statements offense, a false claims
violation requires proof of a claim and its actual presentation to the
government. The term "claim," as held by the Supreme Court,
"reaches beyond 'claims' which might be legally enforced, to all
fraudulent attempts to cause the [g]overnment to pay out sums of
money.' 55 A claim is false, fictitious, or fraudulent if it is untrue
and known to be untrue when made. 5 6 The element of making and
presenting a claim is broadly construed. The defendant need not
make a direct demand to any agency or department of the United
States; claims submitted through an intermediary will suffice.15 7 Fur-
thermore, it is not necessary that the claim actually be honored.,5"
However, knowledge of the claim as false or fraudulent is a requi-
site. Courts have differed on the culpability sufficient to satisfy this
element: some require knowledge of falsity,'59 some specify an intent
to defraud,160 and still others hold that knowledge can be inferred
154. United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 (E.D.
Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105
(1983); see also United States v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 857 (1988); United States v. Causey, 835 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Ferguson, 793 F.2d 828, 831 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 933 (1986);
United States v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587, 596 (lth Cir. 1983). See generally Overly,
Government Contractors, Beware: Civil and Criminal Penalties Abound for Defective
Pricing, 20 LOYOLA L. REV. 597, 627-30 (1987); Survey, supra note 138, at 281-86.
155. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968) (construing
intent of language of the original False Claims Act, which had both criminal and civil
provisions (now separately codified at 18 U.S.C. sections 287 and 1001 (1988), and 31
U.S.C. sections 3729-3733 (1988), respectively)); see also United States v. Jackson, 845
F.2d at 883 (approving an instruction on a definition of "claim" as a demand for money
or transfer of public property or an attempt to cause the government to pay out sums of
money).
156. See United States v. Dorotich, 900 F.2d 192, 194 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 683 n.15 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016
(1982), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994, 1004 n.11
(10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231, 233 n.6 (9th Cir. 1979). A
fraudulent claim, as opposed to one that is false or fictitious, may also require an intent
to deceive. See United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d at 683 n.15; United States v. Milton,
602 F.2d at 233.
157. United States v. Blecker, 657 F.2d 629, 633-34 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1150 (1982). See also United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1382 (6th
Cir.) (where a physician submits a Medicare claim to the government through an in-
surer, and the physician knows that the treatments were unnecessary, the physician is
liable under section 287), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
158. United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d 1293, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also
United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204, 1212 n.10 (9th Cir. 1976) (filing of false tax
return to obtain an unjustified refund will suffice to establish a false claim under section
287), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977).
159. United States v. Precision Medical Laboratories, Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 443 (2d
Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Blecker, 657 F.2d at 634.
160. United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d at 1383; see also United States v. Rifen,
from a reckless disregard for the truth and a conscious effort to
avoid learning the truth. 1' 1 Although neither willfulness nor materi-
ality appear in the statute, some courts apply them as standards or
elements while others do not.16 2 Thus, depending on the jurisdiction,
a scientist who knowingly makes false or fraudulent entries in a
grant application presented to a government agency is in violation of
section 287. Such an allegation may be supported by reason that the
act of supplying false information constitutes a fraudulent attempt to
cause the government to pay money to finance research.
The penalties for false claims and false statements offenses vary
with the date of commission. Sections 287 and 1001 provide for a
maximum prison sentence of five years for each violation.163 For of-
fenses committed prior to December 31, 1984, the monetary penal-
ties contained in the statutes apply.16 4 For those committed after De-
cember 31, 1984, an individual can be fined as much as $250,000.16 5
In addition to sections 287 and 1001, other criminal statutes
might also be implicated in certain cases of scientific misconduct.
For example, if the elements of an applicable criminal statutory of-
fense cannot be established, a scientist might still be liable under 18
U.S.C. section 2.166 Section 2 criminalizes aiding and abetting a
577 F.2d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 1978). Contra United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d at 234
(intent to defraud not an element of section 287 offense); see also United States v.
Maher, 582 F.2d 842, 847 (4th Cir. 1978) (section 287 does not require a specific intent
to defraud), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
161. See United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 821-22 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985); United States v. Holloway, 731 F.2d 378, 380-81 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1021 (1984); United States v. Cook, 586 F.2d 572, 579-80 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979).
162. The willfulness standard has been approved as applied in jury instructions in
section 287 prosecutions. See United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d at 233 n.6; United States
v. Maher, 582 F.2d at 845-47; But see United States v. Ferguson, 793 F.2d 828, 831
(7th Cir. 1986) (government need not prove defendant acted willfully), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 933 (1986); United States v. White, 765 F.2d 1469, 1472 (11th Cir. 1985) (section
287 omits willfulness as an element); United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 682 (10th
Cir. 1981) (willfulness is not an essential element of section 287), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1016 (1982); overruled on other grounds, United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994, 1004
n.I 1 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cook, 586 F.2d at 575 (same). Materiality has
been deemed an element of section 287. United States v. Pruitt, 702 F.2d 152, 155 (8th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1291 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980). Contra
United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 822 (1984);
United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d at 682.
163. See supra notes 135 and 153.
164. Section 1001 provides for maximum fine of $10,000. 18 U.S.C. section 1001
(1988). Section 287, prior to amendment in 1986, provided for the same. Public law 99-
562 amended section 287, substituting "imprisoned not more than five years and shall be
subject to a fine in the amount provided in this title" for "fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 7, 100 Stat. 3169
(1986).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 3623(a) (1988) (repealed 1984) (for offenses committed after
December 31, 1984 and before November 1, 1987); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b) (1988) (for
offenses committed on or after November 1, 1987).
166. Section 2 provides that:
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principal to violate a criminal statute. Thus, a scientist who counsels
or otherwise causes another individual to carry out the proscribed
acts may be liable for the substantive offense of false statements or
false claims under a section 2 prosecution. In the case of Stephen
Breuning, counts one and two of the false statements conviction were
under section 2, aiding and abetting.167
C. Civil Sanctions under the Federal False Claims Act
Cases of scientific misconduct may also invoke civil sanctions pur-
suant to the federal civil False Claims Act (FCA).168 Commonly
considered a tool against defense contract fraud, the FCA authorizes
the government or a private qui tam plaintiff 69 to bring an action to
recover on a false claim upon the United States. The 1986 amend-
ments to the FCA170 greatly expand the feasibility of such suits, in-
creasing the likelihood that those who engage in scientific miscon-
duct will be held liable for FCA penalties and damages. Two cases
of scientific misconduct were recently filed under the amended FCA
provisions.1
31 U.S.C. section 3729(a) delineates conduct giving rise to liabil-
ity under the FCA.17 2 The elements of a claim under the FCA are:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, coun-
sels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by
him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as
a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
167. United States v. Breuning, Criminal No. K-88-0135 (D.C. Md. Nov. 10,
1988).
168. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988).
169. "A qui tam action is one in which the plaintiff sues for himself and on behalf
of the government to recover a penalty under a statute Which provides that part of the
penalty is awarded to the party bringing the suit and the remainder of the penalty is
awarded to the government." United States ex rel. Wis. v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1102
n.1 (7th Cir. 1984). See also United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 729 F.
Supp. 170, 171 n.1 (D. Mass 1990), a f'd, 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 1312 (1991). Qui tam is derived from the latin expression "qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro seipso," which means "he who as much for the king as for himself." See
Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 81, 83 (1972).
170. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153
(codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733). See generally Oparil, The Coming Impact of the
Amended False Claims Act, 22 AKRON L. REV. 525 (1989); Waldman, The 1986
Amendments to the False Claims Act: Retroactive or Prospective?, 18 PuB. CONT. L.J.
469 (1989).
171. Palca, Old Law Puts a New Wrinkle in Fraud Probes, 247 Sci. 802 (1990).
172. Section 3729(a) provides, in relevant part:
(1) that the defendant presented or caused to be presented to an
agent of the United States a claim for payment, or made or used or
caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim
against the United States paid or approved; (2) that the claim and
record or statement were false or fraudulent; (3) that the defendant
knew of the falsity or fraud; and (4) that the United States sustained
damages as a result.173 Liability for each false claims offense carries
a civil penalty as high as $10,000 plus three times the amount of
damages sustained by the government.17 4 These figures represent an
increase over those in the old FCA,17 5 which provided for $2,000
penalties and double damages.'7
The standard of liability and burden of proof are expressly deline-
ated in the amended FCA. These are lower than those required by
courts construing the old FCA, which failed to delineate such stan-
dards. Under the language of the old FCA, some courts applied a
clear and convincing standard of proof for civil FCA prosecutions. 7 7
The amended FCA requires that all elements of a cause of action be
established by a preponderance of the evidence. 7" The standard of
liability is knowledge of the information, including actual knowledge,
or deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth.7 9 Proof of
specific intent to defraud, held a requisite by some courts under the
(a) Liability For Certain Acts. - Any person who -
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee
of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the
United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Govern-
ment; ... is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not
less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of dam-
ages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person....
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
173. See United States ex rel. Stinson v. Provident Life, 721 F. Supp. 1247, 1258-
59 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United States v. Board of Educ. of Union City, 697 F. Supp. 167,
174 (D.N.J. 1988); United States v. Diamond, 657 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Blusal Meats, Inc. v. United States, 638 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
afid, 817 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1987); United States ex reL Fahner v. Alaska, 591 F.
Supp. 794, 797-98 (N.D. I11. 1984); United States v. Lawson, 522 F. Supp. 746, 750
(D.N.J. 1981).
174. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
175. The "old FCA" refers to the False Claims Act prior to the 1986 Amend-
ments. The latest version of the old FCA appears at 31 U.S.C. sections 3729-3731
(1982) (amended 1986).
176. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982) (amended 1986).
177. See United States v. Ekelman & Associates, Inc., 532 F.2d 545, 548 (6th Cir.
1976); United States v. Lawson, 522 F. Supp. 746, 749-50 (D.N.J. 1981). But see Fed-
eral Crop Insurance v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723, 727-28 (8th Cir. 1985) (preponderance of
the evidence standard deemed appropriate); United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968,
971-72 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying a preponderance of the evidence standard).
178. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (1988).
179. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1988).
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old FCA, 80 is not required."' 1 The term "claim" is broadly defined
to include "any request or demand. . . for money or property which
is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United
States Government provides any portion [thereof] ."182 Thus, similar
to a criminal case under false claims, 8' a scientist who knowingly
presents or uses false data or a statement in support of a grant appli-
cation for research monies to the NIH/PHS, as a grantee of federal
funds, is in violation of the FCA. Likewise, proof of damages is not
required for application of the FCA penalty.1 84 Unlike false claims,
however, actual damages caused by the violation must be proven
before the full measure of FCA damages is awarded.1 8 5 Where the
prosecution can meet its burden of proof on this element, a defend-
ant convicted and punished on the basis of the same conduct in a
prior criminal false claims proceeding can, be liable for a second
sanction proportionate to the penalties and damages assessed in a
civil FCA proceeding.18"
The amended FCA lowers the jurisdictional requirements for the
180. See United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d i003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 122-23 (9th Cir. 1970). But see United States v.
Hughes, 585 F.2d 284, 287- 88 (7th Cir. 1978) (government need not prove intent to
defraud); United States v. Ekelman & Associates, Inc., 532 F.2d at 548 (proof of actual
knowledge required); United States v. Cooperative Grain and Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47,
56 (8th Cir. 1973) (knowing submission of false claim sufficient).
181. "[N]o proof of specific intent to defraud is required." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)
(1988).
182. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (1988).
183. See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
184. United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1988); United
States ex rel. Luther v. Consolidated Industries, 720 F. Supp. 919, 922 (N.D. Ala.
1989); United States v. Board of Educ. of Union City, 697 F. Supp. 167, 177 (D.N.J.
1988); Blusal Meats, Inc. v. United States, 638 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
aff'd, 817 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Silver, 384 F. Supp. 617, 620
(E.D.N.Y. 1974), aJfd mem., 515 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1975).
185. United States ex rel. Luther v. Consolidated Industries, 720 F. Supp. at 923;
see also United States v. Hill, 676 F. Supp. 1158, 1180 (N.D. Fla. 1987).
186. See United States v. Pani, 717 F. Supp. 1013, 1017-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
United States v. Diamond, 657 F. Supp. 1204, 1205-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). However, the
Supreme Court recently indicated that the application of FCA penalties subsequent to
criminal false claims penalties may constitute multiple punishment violative of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. United States
v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989). In Halper, the Court held that in the rare case where
a prolific but small-gauge offender previously has sustained a criminal penalty and the
civil penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational relation to the goal of
compensating the government for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as "punishment,"
the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the government's damages so that the trial
court may determine whether the penalty sought amounts to a second punishment viola-
tive of the Clause and set the size of the civil sanction without crossing the line between
remedy and punishment. Id. at 1902.
private initiation of FCA lawsuits. Under the old FCA, a private
person could not bring an action based on evidence or information
the government already knew. 87 This jurisdictional bar is eliminated
in the amended FCA. Instead, the amended statute precludes a pri-
vate qui tam suit if it is based on information publicly disclosed in:
(1) a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing; (2) a Government
Accounting Office report or investigation; or (3) a news media re-
port.1"' Furthermore, even when the allegations are based on pub-
licly disclosed information, an action can still be maintained if the
person bringing suit qualifies as an "original source."'18 9 An original
source is an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of
the information and has provided it voluntarily to the government
before filing suit. 90 Thus, a whistleblower, who is an original source
of information concerning a case of scientific misconduct, could still
bring suit based on that information if the government failed to take
action.
The amended FCA also offers strong incentives for individuals to
exercise a private right of action under the statute. When a private
qui tam plaintiff files an action, the complaint is served on the
United States and remains under seal for sixty days while the gov-
ernment determines whether to intervene and direct the action."" If
the government elects to proceed, "it shall have the primary respon-
sibility for prosecuting the action,' 92 and the qui tam plaintiff con-
tinues as a party to the action. 9 3 Alternatively, if the government
elects not to proceed, the qui tam plaintiff may conduct the ac-
tion.'94 In a successful action, the qui tam plaintiff receives reasona-
187. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982) (amended 1986); see also United States ex
rel. Wis. v. Dean, 729 F.2d at 1103 (jurisdictional bar of the FCA applies when the
government has prior knowledge of the information on which the suit is based, even if the
plaintiff is the source of that information).
188. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988). Other qul tam actions that are barred
under the statute include: (1) actions brought by members of the armed forces against
members of the armed forces arising out of such persons' service in the armed forces; (2)
actions brought against a member of Congress, the judiciary, or a senior executive
branch official if the action is based on information already known to the government;
(3) actions based on information which is the subject of a civil suit or an administrative
civil money penalty proceeding in which the government is already a party. 31 U.S.C. §
3730(e)(l)-(3).
189. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988); Houck ex rel. United States v. Folding
Carton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 504 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1471
(1990); see also United Stats ex rel. Stinson v. Provident Life, 721 F.Supp. 1247, 1257-
58 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (even though some information forming the basis of suit was ob-
tained during prior state civil litigation, law firm was a proper qui tam plaintiff because
it qualified as an original source).
190. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1988).
191. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1988).
192. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (1988).
193. Id.
194. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (1988).
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ble expenses and attorney fees plus a percentage of the proceeds: a
maximum of 25 % if the government directs the case 195 and a maxi-
mum of 30% if the qui tam plaintiff conducts the action.196 These
percentages are higher than those in the old FCA, which provided
for maximums of 10% and 25%, respectively.19 Moreover, the
amended FCA imposes liability on employers who discharge or dis-
criminate against employees because they bring or assist in an FCA
proceeding, authorizing double back pay, damages, and attorney
fees.198 Thus, in addition to increased awards, FCA plaintiffs and
informers enjoy employment protections not available under the old
FCA. To the extent that whistleblowers informing on suspected sci-
entific misconduct have experienced employment sanctions in the
past,199 they stand to benefit from these protections as FCA plaintiffs
or informants.
V. CONCLUSION
Scientific misconduct in academia is a multifacted, potentially
widespread problem with significant legal implications. Factors in-
cluding the nature of medical education, the academic promotions
system, and the apparent shortcomings in institutional self-regula-
tion and editorial peer review all promote an environment that fos-
ters this problem. Current federal efforts to regulate misconduct in
science place the burden of responsibility for investigation of cases
upon awardee institutions. They further allow flexibility in the adop-
tion of procedures consistent with due process, attempt to ensure
confidentiality of participants and provide for review of investiga-
tions at the federal agency level. Sanctions for those guilty of scien-
tific misconduct range from debarment from federal programs sup-
porting research to the imposition of substantial fines and
imprisonment under federal statutes prohibiting false statements and
195. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (1988).
196. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (1988). However, the amended FCA also offers some
-benefits to a defendant who prevails against a bad faith claimant. Section 3730(d)(4)
provides:
If the [g]overnment does not proceed with the action and the person bringing
the action conducts the action, the court may award to the defendant its rea-
sonable attorneys' fees and expenses if the defendant prevails in the action and
the court finds that the claim of the person bringing the action was clearly
frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of harassment.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) (1988).
197. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (1982) (amended 1986).
198. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1988).
199. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
false claims. One such sanction, the amended FCA, could have
broad application to the prosecution of serious misconduct because
of the lowered requirements and increased potential benefits ac-
corded private individuals qualifying for a right of action under the
statute.
A comprehensive program designed to deal with scientific miscon-
duct requires that effective prevention and detection measures be im-
plemented. While the current federal provisions help fulfill a need
for deterrence and ensure timely, responsible institutional reviews of
misconduct cases, they address the problem in an ex post facto fash-
ion. Efforts targeted toward changing the environment that promotes
misconduct and the dissemination of tainted research results should
be made. This will require individual academic institutions to adopt
self-policing activities to ensure quality research and valid reporting
of results. Comprehensive standards of ethical conduct for research-
ers must also be developed and applied. The solution should include
minimizing the pressure to publish for promotion, developing institu-
tional policies that ensure discipline in the conduct of research, and
increasing editorial oversight and verification by scientific journals.
The current regulations structuring the response of the academic
community to the problem of scientific misconduct are fairly recent.
There has not been sufficient time since the application of increased
federal oversight to assess the efficacy of existing regulations. To-
gether with more rigorous application of the FCA and other statu-
tory sanctions, current federal efforts may be sufficient to deter fu-
ture misconduct in science. If it is not, and the scientific community
fails to adequately respond to the need for prevention and detection,
increased federal regulatory measures may be necessary to control
and correct scientific misconduct. The risk will be the end of self-
regulation in science.
C. BETH SIsE
